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Abstract:
The goal of the paper is to determine the meta-ethical influence of the ‘natu-
ralistic fallacy’ argument formulated by George E. Moore. In the first part of the 
paper, the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ argument is subject to critical analysis. In the 
following parts of the work, the influence of this argument on the inception of 
two main meta-ethical standpoints – namely naturalism and antinaturalism – is 
indicated. What is more, the paper contains the assessment of strengths and 
weaknesses of these meta-ethical conceptions.
Keywords: 
naturalistic fallacy, metaethics, naturalism, antinaturalism, emotivism 
Streszczenie:
Celem artykułu jest próba ustalenia jaki wpływ na rozwój metaetyki miał zarzut 
„błędu naturalistycznego’ sformułowany przez George’a E. Moore’a. W pierw-
szej części artykułu zarzut ten został poddany krytycznej analizie. W kolejnych 
częściach tekstu wskazano wpływ owego zarzutu na wykształcenie się głów-
nych stanowisk metaetycznych, w szczególności naturalizmu oraz antynatu-
ralizmu. W artykule dyskutowane są również mocne oraz słabe strony tych 
koncepcji metaetycznych.
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Introduction
Philosophical research on morality has been 
divided into two categories. The first of these 
is the study of general moral issues that con-
sist in attempts to answer such moral ques-
tions as: ‘Which deeds are good and which are 
bad?’, ‘What kind of person should one be?’ 
or ‘What has moral value?’. Normative ethics 
is concerned with these studies, and as their 
result various moral judgments are formulated. 
Ethical theories built within normative ethics are 
sometimes referred to as first-order theories. 
The second category of philosophical research 
on morality concerns the nature of morality and 
moral judgments, and examples of questions 
related to these issues are: ‘Do moral truths 
or properties exist?’, ‘Do moral judgments ex-
press convictions or emotions?’ or ‘What is the 
relationship between morality and rationality?’ 
These studies belong to metaethics, because 
as their result, it is not moral judgments that 
are formulated, but claims about morality and 
moral judgments. Therefore, the ethical theo-
ries built within metaethics are sometimes 
called second-order theories, paying attention 
to the important difference between ethics and 
metaethics.
From the perspective of the history of philoso-
phy, many thinkers have undertaken consid-
erations on the nature of moral judgments and 
morality, but systematic meta-ethical reflection 
was undertaken much later, at the beginning 
of the 20th century, and the reason for their 
commencement was the publication of Prin-
cipia Ethica by George E. Moore in 1903. In his 
groundbreaking work, the British philosopher 
undertakes to answer not only to the traditional 
questions of normative ethics, but – what is par-
ticularly important – he builds the first mature 
meta-ethical theory, or the theory of meaning of 
moral judgments. The formulation of this theory 
was possible due to Moore’s clear distinction 
between considerations about what is good 
from the considerations about the concept of 
good. It is on this distinction that his famous 
naturalistic fallacy argument is based – a fallacy 
which is to be committed by anyone who de-
fines moral concepts. In particular, when he de-
fines them in naturalistic terms. The importance 
of this aforementioned domain distinction was 
so great that in the first half of the twentieth 
century, metaethics completely dominated 
moral philosophy, and it was only in the 1970s, 
when traditional questions of normative ethics 
regained their prestige. This was mainly due to 
the fact that many contemporary philosophers 
thought that thanks to Moore, ethics was grant-
ed the basis on which real research on morality 
and moral judgments became possible for the 
first time in the history of philosophy[1].
Distinguishing ethical theories of the first and 
second order quickly led to the development 
of three meta-ethical theories which dominated 
the first half of the twentieth century, namely 
emotivism, antinaturalism and naturalism. It 
is difficult to provide uncontroversial descrip-
tion of these theories, in particular naturalism 
and antinaturalism, but it seems that they can 
be distinguished by taking into account two 
questions: the ontological question – ‘Do mor-
al properties exist?’ – and an epistemological 
question – ‘How can one learn moral proper-
ties?’. Naturalists argue that moral properties 
exist and can be known by empirical methods. 
According to antinaturalists, moral properties 
also exist, but they believe that they cannot 
be known by empirical methods. On the other 
1Baldwin, T., Moore, G. E. (1990) The Arguments of the
Philosophers, Honderich, T. (ed.) Londyn, Routledge, p. 66.
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hand, the emotivists claim that moral properties 
do not exist. Hence, they cannot be known by 
empirical methods. Before presenting the influ-
ence of Moore’s argument on the development 
of these theories, it is worth paying attention to 
the meta-ethical views of this philosopher.
Moore’s argument
Opposing the naturalistic ethical theories, 
which assume that moral truths can be found 
by referring to the nature of man, Moore 
claimed that the basic moral truths are in-
dependent of the moral subject. In Principia 
Ethica, the British philosopher argued that the 
status of these truths is close to the status of 
the truths of arithmetic, because they are ab-
stract, necessary and concern the values that 
belong to certain states of things due to their 
essence. In addition, these truths are known 
directly, by means of a special kind of moral 
intuition. Supporting the claim about the spe-
cial status of moral truths, Moore stated that 
ethical theories, which define values referring 
to facts, such as facts about human nature, 
are based on a naturalistic fallacy. What is 
more, he claimed that this mistake ‘can be 
found in almost every ethical work’[2].
The term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ is introduced by 
Moore in the context of considerations about 
the analogy between the qualities ‘yellow’ and 
‘good’. He believes that just as it is a mistake to 
define ‘yellow’ by referring to physical proper-
ties that cause some objects to be perceived as 
yellow, it is also wrong to define ‘good’ by refer-
ring to the natural properties of things that make 
it good. In addition, ‘yellow’ and ‘good’ are sim-
ple concepts that cannot be explained to some-
one who does not know the color of yellow and 
what good is. This leads to the conclusion that 
‘good’ is not a natural and definable property. 
In the context of Moore’s ethical considerations, 
this solution is particularly important, because 
he believes that the concept of good is the most 
fundamental moral concept.
The key argument of the author of Principia 
Ethics against the naturalistic ethical theories, 
supporting the thesis about the indefinability of 
2Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica, http://www.gutenberg.org/ 
files/53430/53430-h/53430-h.htm.
With few exceptions, under the influence of Moore, the 20th 
century began with the rejection of naturalism in ethics. It 
occurred despite the fact that many modern philosophers 
assumed that their research is a continuation of scientific 
research, and the facts about human nature are in a close 
relation to traditional philosophical questions, in particular 
with ethical questions.
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good, was called ‘the open-question argument’. 
This argument has the form of a thought experi-
ment, which should be carried out by all who 
come across the definition of good; it was de-
scribed by the author as follows:
The hypothesis that disagreement about the 
meaning of good is disagreement with regard 
to the correct analysis of a given whole, may 
be most plainly seen to be incorrect by con-
sideration of the fact that, whatever definition 
be offered, it may be always asked, with sig-
nificance, of the complex so defined, whether 
it is itself good. To take, for instance, one of 
the more plausible, because one of the more 
complicated, of such proposed definitions, it 
may easily be thought, at first sight, that to be 
good may mean to be that which we desire to 
desire. Thus if we apply this definition to a par-
ticular instance and say ‘When we think that 
A is good, we are thinking that A is one of the 
things which we desire to desire,’ our proposi-
tion may seem quite plausible. But, if we carry 
the investigation further, and ask ourselves 
‘Is it good to desire to desire A?’ it is appar-
ent, on a little reflection, that this question is 
itself as intelligible, as the original question ‘Is 
A good?’—that we are, in fact, now asking for 
exactly the same information about the desire 
to desire A, for which we formerly asked with 
regard to A itself. But it is also apparent that 
the meaning of this second question cannot be 
correctly analysed into ‘Is the desire to desire 
A one of the things which we desire to desire?’: 
we have not before our minds anything so 
complicated as the question ‘Do we desire to 
desire to desire to desire A?’ Moreover any one 
can easily convince himself by inspection that 
the predicate of this proposition—‘good’—is 
positively different from the notion of ‘desiring 
to desire’ which enters into its subject: ‘That 
we should desire to desire A is good’ is not 
merely equivalent to ‘That A should be good 
is good.’ It may indeed be true that what we 
desire to desire is always also good; perhaps, 
even the converse may be true: but it is very 
doubtful whether this is the case, and the 
mere fact that we understand very well what 
is meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we 
have two different notions before our minds[3].
Considering any definition of good, according 
to which it is identical to the complex property 
of W, it will always be reasonable to ask whether 
W is good. In other words, whether W is good 
is an open question, because denying that W is 
good is not contradictory. On the other hand, 
the question of whether W is W is meaningless 
– it is not an open question, because the denial 
that W is W is contradictory. It follows that good 
cannot be identical to any complex property. 
The basic assumption of the open-question ar-
gument is that any proposal to define good will 
the truth of any proposal to define good is an 
open question to anyone who understands the 
concepts that appear in it.
Many objections were raised against the open-
question argument, three of which seem particu-
larly important. First, Moore does not justify that 
this argument will work for all possible definitions 
of good. Although he considers a few such spe-
cific definitions – such as the view that good is 
pleasure, the view that good is what we desire 
and the view that good is what we desire to de-
sire – in regards to which this argument works 
very well, it cannot be solely stated on this basis 
that the definition of good is impossible.
The second, much more serious objection 
against Moore’s argument consists in the fact 
that he assumes that good cannot be identical to 
3 Ibidem, p. 18–19.
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the complex property of W if the expression ‘W 
is good’ is analytic or true by definition. The fact 
that pleasure is pleasant can be deduced on the 
basis of conceptual analysis – because it is true 
by definition – but it is not an analytical judgment 
that pleasure is good. Many modern philoso-
phers reject this assumption. Some natural prop-
erties are identical to others, although judgments 
expressing these identities are not analytical[4]. 
For example, water is H2O – the property of be-
ing water is identical to the property of being H2O 
– despite the fact that the judgments express-
ing this identity is not true by definition. In other 
words, the analysis of the concept of water and 
the concept of H2O does not allow to recognize 
this identity. The open-question argument is 
therefore effective only in relation to analytic defi-
nitions – synthetic definitions are resistant to it.
The third argument against the open-question 
argument is related to the so-called ‘paradox of 
analysis – a problem perceived by Moore him-
self. This paradox consists in the fact that con-
ceptual analysis cannot be both correct and non-
trivial, because if it is correct, it is trivial, and if it is 
nontrivial, it is incorrect. The paradox of analysis 
is problematic for the open-question argument, 
because this argument seems to lead to the con-
clusion that a question which is not deprived of 
meaning, for example, ‘Is what we desire to de-
sire good?’ is as trivial as the question ‘ Is what 
we desire to desire in fact what we desire to 
desire?’. In order to better explain this problem, 
it is worth introducing a distinction between se-
mantic analysis and philosophical analysis and a 
distinction between concepts and properties[5]. 
4Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press; Putnam, H. The meaning of ‘meaning’, 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, p. 131–193.  
5Sosa, E., Moore, E. (2001), in: Martinich, A. P. , Sosa, D. (eds.) A 
Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 46. 
For example, the semantic analysis of ‘bachelor’ 
leads to the formulation ‘unmarried man’, and 
the question ‘Is a bachelor an unmarried man?’ 
is trivial. On the other hand, while the expression 
‘what we desire to desire’ cannot be considered 
as the result of the analysis of the term ’good’, it 
does not mean that the expression cannot be the 
result of a correct philosophical analysis of good, 
because this analysis does not only rely on the 
superficial meaning of the analyzed concept[6].
Interestingly, different versions of the open-ques-
tion argument were used by many philosophers 
in the twentieth century, depending on whether 
they agreed to the internalism proposed by Da-
vid Hume[7]. This conception consisted in the as-
sumption that motivation is internal in relation to 
moral judgments. Therefore, it is not possible to 
issue authentic moral judgments without having 
a certain motivation for acting in accordance with 
them or having appropriate emotions. If internal-
ism is real, then the open question ‘I understand 
that this is good, but why should I care?’ be-
comes groundless[8]. This question is meaning-
less and therefore the proposed analysis fails.
Moore’s considerations had one more conse-
quence, which had a significant impact on the 
subsequent meta-ethical discussion. Despite 
the fact that the main target of criticism of the 
British philosopher were naturalistic theories, he 
saw that his arguments reached much further. 
The claim about the indefinability of good can 
be raised in relation to each theory, the purpose 
of which is to determine what it is, and therefore 
6Ibidem. 
7Stout, R. (2008) Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy, in: 
Moran, D, (ed.) The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century 
Philosophy, Nowy Jork: Routledge, p. 854.
8Ibidem. 
Polish Law Review  www.polishlawreview.pl
ORIGINAL ARTICLENaturalistic fallacy
267
also against metaphysical theories, which iden-
tify it with a supranatural property, in particular 
against theological theories[9]. This leads to the 
conclusion that Moore was an opponent of not 
only naturalism, but also supranaturalism, be-
cause good cannot be identified only with what, 
for example, we desire to desire, but also with, 
for example, metaphysical property of being in 
harmony with the will of God. Interestingly, de-
spite the differences between naturalism and su-
pranaturalism, the British philosopher recognized 
that in both cases, the error of defining good is so 
similar that it can be called generally a ’naturalis-
tic fallacy’. Therefore, the theories against which 
this argument may be raised are not only natu-
ralistic, but they are all theories that define good. 
For many, this consequence of Moore’s argu-
mentation has made his positive meta-ethical 
position difficult to accept. He claims that good 
is neither a natural nor a supranatural property, 
which leads to the conclusion that it must belong 
to yet another, special ontological category to 
which only moral properties belong[10]. This so-
lution has not been made more convincing by 
stating that we can get to know these properties 
through a special kind of moral intuition, which 
also seems to be difficult to define. 
In summary, despite many ambiguities and prob-
lems related to the open-question argument, it 
remains an influential argument in the history of 
philosophy. The first great meta-ethical theories 
built in the twentieth century, such as emotivism 
or antinaturalism, arose in a philosophical con-
text in which it was generally agreed that, on the 
one hand, Moore demonstrated that good is in-
definable, but on the other hand his positive ethi-
9Moore, G. E. Zasady etyki, op. cit., p. 115.
10Stout, R. Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy, op. cit., p. 855.
cal views – according to which moral truths have 
a special ontological and epistemological status 
– are unsustainable. What is more, it seems justi-
fied to say that despite the rejection of Moore’s 
solutions regarding what good is, in the current 
meta-ethical discussion, one can still observe the 
strong influence of his argumentation about what 
it is not – which is evidenced by the continuing 
discussion of naturalistic fallacy[11].
Moral naturalism
Moral naturalism is a meta-ethical view accord-
ing to which moral properties exist and can be 
known by empirical methods. For two reasons, 
this seems to be a particularly attractive stance. 
First, if moral properties do exist, then theories of 
normative ethics do not lose their raison d’être, 
because the basic category of objects postu-
lated by these theories is moral properties. Thus, 
these theories describe a part of reality. Second-
ly, if these properties can be learned by empirical 
methods, then the philosophical search for these 
properties may refer to the results of the empiri-
cal sciences, in particular those that are relevant 
to questions about the nature of moral judg-
ments, such as psychology or biology. 
With few exceptions, under the influence of 
Moore, the 20th century began with the rejection 
of naturalism in ethics. It occurred despite the 
fact that many modern philosophers assumed 
that their research is continuous with science, 
and that the facts about human nature are in a 
close relation to traditional philosophical ques-
tions, in particular to ethical questions. Along 
with the emergence of analytic philosophy, the 
views on the method and domain of philosophy 
11Brożek, A., Brożek, B., Stelmach, J. (2013) Fenomen 
normatywności, Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, p. 195–204.
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have undergone a significant change, mainy be-
cause language and logic have become the main 
subjects of philosophical interest, and special at-
tention has been paid to confusing conceptual 
issues with factual issues. These transformations 
have caused that many philosophers recognized 
philosophy as a discipline independent of the 
empirical sciences. This conviction also con-
cerned considerations about the nature of moral 
judgments. From today’s perspective, this solu-
tion may seem unconvincing, because the find-
ings of some sciences are particularly valuable in 
the context of questions about the nature of mor-
al judgments: psychology describes the reason-
ing and motivation in moral contexts, history de-
scribes the cultural evolution of moral systems, 
and the theory of evolution gives insight into the 
biological nature of man. Due to the above dis-
tinction between conceptual and factual issues, 
these scientific disciplines were, however, gener-
ally regarded as unrelated to ethics.
The motivation of naturalists is therefore the 
desire to practice ethics in the context of the 
empirical sciences, which is an expression of a 
more general view that philosophical considera-
tions can be viewed as continuous with science. 
The assumption that moral properties are natu-
ral, however, requires determining what natural 
property is, which turned out to be extremely 
problematic. However, we can roughly say that 
natural property is a property which is recognized 
either in everyday experience or the property to 
which scientific theories refer. According to this 
description, natural properties that may play a 
role in ethical considerations may be related to, 
for example, a person’s preferences, his desires, 
emotions or dispositions. The ’naturalistic fal-
lacy’ argument concerns those naturalistic ethi-
cal theories that define moral concepts in terms 
of the aforementioned natural characteristics of a 
person. However, not all naturalists defined moral 
concepts in this way – some of them postulated 
only the grounding of these concepts in naturalist 
terminology. Not all naturalists, therefore, intend-
ed to reduce moral properties to natural proper-
ties, which is a straightforward consequence of 
identyfing identities between properties belong-
ing to these two categories. It seems that Moore 
assumed that the acceptance of a naturalistic po-
sition must lead to this kind of reduction[12].
However, the reduction of moral properties to 
natural properties would be implied by naturalism 
only if it were based on the assumption that with 
respect to any natural property, we can provide a 
corresponding term which would not be a moral 
term[13]. In such a situation, if ’good’ refers to a 
certain natural property, there will also be a natu-
ral term that can be combined with ’good’ and to 
which ‘good’ will be reduced[14]. However, there is 
no guarantee that even when all moral terms refer 
to natural properties, it will be possible to replace 
the moral terms with natural terms. The assumption 
that all moral terms correspond to a moral property, 
but it is impossible to reduce these terms to natural 
terms is accepted by philosophers, which are de-
scribed as non-reductive naturalists. 
One of the most influential ethical naturalists of 
the first half of the twentieth century, John Dew-
ey, was a proponent of such non-reductionism. 
On the one hand, he claimed that moral judg-
ments refer to moral values, and these judg-
ments can be examined via scientific method[15].
12Sturgeon, N. (2006) Ethical Naturalism, in: Copp, D. (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 98.
13Ibidem.
14Ibidem.
15Andersen, E. (2014) Dewey’s Moral Philosophy, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.
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Opposing to the separation of science from dis-
ciplines such as moral philosophy, Dewey wrote:
The other generic change lies in doing away 
once for all with the traditional distinction 
between moral goods, like the virtues, and 
natural goods like health, economic security, 
art, science and the like. The point of view 
under discussion is not the only one which 
has deplored this rigid distinction and en-
deavored to abolish it. Some schools have 
even gone so far as to regard moral excel-
lencies, qualities of character as of value 
only because they promote natural goods. 
But the experimental logic when carried into 
morals makes every quality that is judged to 
be good according as it contributes to ame-
lioration of existing ills. And in so doing, it 
enforces the moral meaning of natural sci-
ence. When all is said and done in criticism 
of present social deficiencies, one may well 
wonder whether the root difficulty does not 
lie in the separation of natural and moral 
science. When physics, chemistry, biology, 
medicine, contribute to the detection of con-
crete human woes and to the development 
of plans for remedying them and relieving the 
human estate, they become moral; they be-
edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dewey-moral/.
come part of the apparatus of moral inquiry 
or science[16].
The empirical method allows not only to reach 
the scientific truth, but also the moral truth. 
On the other hand, according to the American 
philosopher and psychologist, moral values as-
sociated with the feeling of happiness and are 
essential for morality only in that they provide 
material that is then developed in the process of 
rational construction of value[17]. Dewey’s inten-
tion was to ground morality in experience, which 
was an expression of opposition to overly ra-
tionalistic normative ethics, for example, Kant’s 
ethics based on a categorical imperative, which 
he would call ’empty formalism’[18].
Moral principles can therefore be tested just like 
scientific truths are tested. Conducting tests of 
moral principles makes it possible, first, to im-
prove these principles when they do not give 
clear guidelines a specific mode of action. Sec-
ondly, as Dewey claimed, practical verification 
of moral hypotheses ensures their correctness. 
16Dewey, J. Reconstruction in Philosophy, http://www.gutenberg. 
org/files/40089/40089-h/40089-h.htm#CHAPTER_VII.
17Stout, R. Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy, op. cit., p. 855. 
18Andersen, E. Dewey’s Moral Philosophy, op. cit. 
These philosophers believe that something which cannot 
be captured by any naturalistic analysis of the moral lan-
guage is the emotions of the speaker, which for them have 
become the main subject of interest in connection with the 
nature of morality and moral judgments.
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If the action in accordance with these hypoth-
eses does not lead to the consequences they 
describe, they should be changed accordingly. 
Action in accordance with moral hypotheses 
therefore provides data on the same principle 
in which scientific experiments provide data to 
scientists who use this data to build and refine 
their theories[19].
For modern non-reductive naturalism, the notion 
of supervenience is important. Two very gener-
al properties of supervenience can be pointed 
out, which are invariably the starting point in 
the discussion about it. First, supervenience 
is a relation. The members of this relation can, 
however, be defined differently. In the context 
of ethical naturalism, however, the relation be-
tween natural properties and moral properties 
is most often discussed. Secondly, this relation 
defines a particular dependence between its el-
ements. This relation is best expressed by the 
words of David Lewis: ‘There are no differences 
of one kind, without differences of a different 
kind.’[20] It means that if two sets of properties 
are provided, namely set A and set B, then if the 
moral properties belonging to A supervene on 
the natural properties belonging to B, a change 
in B results in a change in A.. In other words, if 
there is a change in the basic properties, there 
must also be a change in the supervening prop-
erties. Supervenience assumes the depend-
ence of supervening (moral) properties on basic 
(natural) properties, and at the same time gives 
supervening properties a certain autonomy. Fur-
thermore, supervening properties do not have 
to correspond to a specific set of basic proper-
ties, because they can be implemented by vari-
19Ibidem. 
20Lewis, D. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, p. 14. 
ous basic properties, according to the multiple 
realizability thesis. Interestingly, despite the ex-
traordinary role that supervenience now plays in 
the philosophy of mind, this term was used for 
the first time in the context of meta-ethical con-
siderations, and it was done by Richard Hare in 
the work The Language of Morals published in 
1952[21]. This relation did appear earlier in meta-
ethical considerations, but it was not called ‘su-
pervenience’ at the time. For example, Moore, 
in his work Philosophical Studies from 1922, 
defining the relation between natural and moral 
properties, stated that: ‘if a thing has, to some 
extent, internal value, then this thing must pos-
sess this value not only in the same degree in all 
circumstances, but everything which is exactly 
the same must, in all circumstances, possess it 
to the same extent’[22]. This feature of the rela-
tion between natural and moral properties cor-
responds, of course, to supervenience, because 
it is based on the principle that ‘there are no dif-
ferences of one kind, without differences of an-
other kind’. 
Despite the above advantages of superveni-
ence, significant difficulties are also associated 
with this relation. One of them consists in the 
fact that supervenience may not fulfill the hopes 
placed in it by moral naturalists, because it may 
also be used by antinaturalists. It does not de-
termine how supervenient properties exist and 
does not allow their reduction to basic prop-
erties. This relation allows for the existence of 
superveniening properties in a world separate 
from the natural one. A quintessential example 
– taken from the philosophy of mind – is the use 
of supervenience by proponents of epiphenom-
21Hare, R. (1952) The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
22Moore, G. E. (1922) Philosophical Studies, London: Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., p. 268.
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enalism, which is a dualistic stance. According 
to the epiphenomenalists, mental properties do 
not have a ‘causal force’ because they belong to 
a separate ontological category. However, they 
supervene on physical properties that have the 
possibility of causal influence. Physical proper-
ties can affect not only other physical proper-
ties, but also mental properties.
The most important problem of supervenience 
seems to be its excessive generality. This rela-
tion allows only a rather ambiguous statement 
that objects having the same physical proper-
ties will have the same moral properties. How-
ever, this dependence is too weak to be able 
to indicate which physical properties determine 
moral properties. For example, the view that mo-
rality is closely related to the functioning of the 
human mind, in particular how it issues moral 
judgments, seems to be plausible. The correct 
characterization of moral judgments should also, 
however, take into account, among others, the 
biological and social contexts of their issuing. In 
contrast, such physical properties as the color 
of one’s hair, the type of clothing worn, or one’s 
foot size do not seem to have much impact on 
moral judgments. The supervenience relation-
ship, however, does not provide precise hints 
as to which physical properties should be basic 
properties for moral properties.
Emotivism
Many philosophers have leaned towards natu-
ralism, but – due to, i.a., Moore’s argumenta-
tion – they regarded it as an untenable view. On 
the other hand, they were skeptical in regards 
with the thesis about the existence of unnatural 
and non-empirical moral properties. These phi-
losophers believe that something which cannot 
be captured by any naturalistic analysis of the 
moral language is the emotions of the speaker, 
which for them have become the main subject 
of interest in connection with the nature of mo-
rality and moral judgments. Therefore, the ethi-
cal theories they have built are called emotiv-
ist. Although some elements of emotivism can 
be found in earlier philosophers, in particular 
David Hume, the first mature emotivist theory 
was created by British philosophers from the 
1920s and 1930s, in particular Charles Ogden 
and Ivor Richards. An important subject of 
these philosophers’ research was the situa-
tions in which language actually refers to cer-
tain objects, and when it only appears to refer 
to something real. In their book The meaning 
of meaning, one can find the following excerpt 
about the language of ethics:
This peculiar ethical use of ‘good’ is, we sug-
gest, a purely emotive use. When so used the 
word stands for nothing whatever, and has no 
symbolic function. Thus, when we so use it in 
the sentence, ‘This is good,’ we merely refer to 
tins, and the addition of ‘is good’ makes no dif-
ference whatever to our reference. When on the 
other hand, we say ‘This is red,’ the addition of 
‘is red’ to ‘this’ does symbolize an extension of 
our reference, namely, to some other red thing. 
But ‘is good’ has no comparable symbolic func-
tion; it serves only as an emotive sign express-
ing our attitude to this, and perhaps evoking 
similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting 
them to actions of one kind or another[23].
This means that moral judgments are non-
cognitive. Their role is to influence the mental 
states or attitudes of others. They do not de-
scribe or represent facts, as cognitivists would 
claim – that includes both naturalists and moral 
23Ogden, C., Richards, I. (1923) The meaning of meaning, New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & Young, p. 125. 
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antinaturalists. Emotivists were of the opinion 
that the categories of truth and falsehood do 
not apply to moral judgments. For example, 
the statement ‘killing is bad’ is not intended to 
describe any fact about killing, but only to ex-
press the speaker’s negative attitude towards 
this act. Thus, the emotivists deny that there 
are moral properties that the words ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ would correspond to. Moral judgments 
express emotions, and any other content of 
these judgments plays only a marginal role. 
The idea was further developed by Alfred J. 
Ayer and Charles Stevenson, the most well-
known representatives of emotivism[24]. Ste-
venson clearly stated: ‘There is no doubt that 
there is always an element of description in 
moral judgments, but that is not all. Their basic 
role does not consist in the description of facts, 
but in influencing others’[25]. This solution is of 
considerable importance for the status of moral 
discourse, because if it does not correspond to 
any facts, then moral disputes can be reduced 
to the difference in the emotions of the partici-
pants in this dispute; these emotions concern 
the moral issue being the subject of the dispute. 
The goal of moral discourse is to influence the 
emotions of the other participants in this dis-
course. This meta-ethical theory is immune to 
the accusation of a naturalistic fallacy, because 
in this theory, moral terms do not refer to moral 
concepts, which in turn could be applied cor-
rectly or incorrectly in specific situations. It can 
even be said that emotivism is an attempt to an-
swer Moore’s argument.
In addition, emotivism has at least two advan-
24Ayer, A. J. (1936) Language, Truth and Logic, Londyn: 
Gollancz; Stevenson, C. (1937) The Emotive Meaning of Ethical 
Terms, Mind, 46, p. 14–31. 
25Stevenson, C. The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, op. cit., 
p. 18.
tages over other meta-ethical theories that were 
created in the initial phase of metaethics’ develop-
ment. First, it clearly shows how moral judgments 
can motivate people to act in accordance with 
these judgments. Both naturalism and anti-natu-
ralism assume that moral judgments express be-
liefs whose role, in accordance with the universally 
accepted model of practical reasoning proposed 
by David Hume, consists in representing means 
to achieve a given goal. The goals of the action 
are determined by non-cognitive states, such as 
emotions or desires. This model is aptly described 
by Hume when he claims that ‘reason is and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions’[26]. If 
moral judgments express emotions that motivate 
people to act, it is easy to explain that people will 
have a tendency to act in accordance with the 
moral judgments they express.
Another advantage of emotivism is a simple 
explanation of the relation of supervenience 
between the moral and natural properties. Two 
states of affairs that differ in their moral char-
acteristics will also differ in their natural char-
acteristics, because if two states of affairs are 
significantly different from each other, then a 
given person will have the disposition to feel dif-
ferent emotions as the response to these states 
of affairs. If, on the other hand, two states of af-
fairs are significantly similar to each other, then 
a given person will have the disposition to feel 
the same emotions in relation to these states of 
affairs, and the moral characteristics of these 
states of affairs will be the same. 
However, a number of objections have been 
formulated against emotivism, which in gen-
eral have led to abandoning of this meta-ethical 
theory. One of them was formulated by Peter 
26Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature, http://www.davidhume. 
org/texts/thn.html.
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Geach and John Searle, who noticed that emo-
tivism satisfactorily explains the meaning of 
only simple, affirmative moral statements – for 
example, ‘Killing is bad’ – the meaning of which 
is meant to only be an illusion[27]. Moral sentenc-
es, however, often occur also in other forms, in 
particular they may be more complex – such as 
the sentence ‘If killing is bad, euthanasia is im-
moral.’ In this context, the statement that the 
speaker only expresses his negative emotions 
about killing is unconvincing. Logical inference 
does not concern emotions, but objects refer-
ring to reality, and therefore having truth value.
In addition, emotivism unsatisfactorily explains 
the status of moral discourse, in which the ra-
tionality of argumentation allows only to influ-
ence the behavior of other participants in this 
discourse – by affecting their emotions – which 
basically brings this discourse to attempts to 
manipulate other people. However, the authen-
tic moral discourse consists in something more, 
because it should provide the participants of 
this discourse with reasons for action, on the 
basis of which they can rationally accept the 
moral views of others. If a given person thinks 
that they should not behave according to a cer-
tain moral principle, then it seems correct to say 
that they do not agree with this principle, and 
not only with the emotional disposition of some-
one who has formulated this principle. In other 
words, the emotional disposition of the author 
of this principle does not easily become the ba-
sis for the action consistent with it.
These problems have led to the fall of original 
emotivism, but other non-cognitive theories still 
play a large role in meta-ethical considerations. 
27Geach, P. (1960) Ascriptivism, Philosophical Review, 69, 
p. 221–225; Searle, J. (1962) Meaning and Speech Acts, 
Philosophical Review, 71, p. 423–432. 
Due to the above problems of emotivism, the 
main tendency in the development of these the-
ories consisted in taking into account morality-
related objectivity and rationality to the biggest 
extent possible, while at the same time denying 
that moral judgments are descriptive[28]. An inter-
esting example of contemporary non-cognitive 
theory is the expressivism of Allan Gibbard, who 
understands moral judgments not as simple ex-
pressions of emotions, but as complex, higher-
order attitudes. This expressiveness implies that 
the negative moral judgment concerning a given 
act is based on the acceptance of the norm, ac-
cording to which a negative emotional reaction 
as a response to this action is correct, which in-
dicates how, in a moral context, one can judge 
feelings in terms of their rationality. This solution 
makes it possible to assess whether specific 
emotional responses are appropriate or not with-
out reference to moral values that would justify 
this assessment.
Moral antinaturalism
Antinaturalists claim that moral properties do ex-
ist, but it is impossible to know them using em-
pirical methods. Both naturalists and moral an-
tinaturalists are, in contrast to non-cognitivists, 
moral realists, but only anti-naturalists empha-
size the autonomy of moral philosophy in rela-
tion to science. This autonomy is a consequence 
of the assumption that moral properties are not 
natural properties. In some philosophers, this as-
sumption generates an extremely strong, nega-
tive reaction. The pressure on antinaturalists is 
connected with the plausible claim that there 
cannot be two completely independent, natu-
ral, and moral domains. The first one would be 
a well-known domain of the empirical sciences, 
28Stout, R. Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy, op. cit., p. 861.
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and the latter a much more mysterious domain of 
moral philosophy. It seems that if there really are 
properties of being good or bad, then they must 
be properties of natural objects such as people 
or their actions. It also seems that natural ob-
jects can only have natural properties. The thesis 
about the existence of separate moral properties 
leads to the assumption of the existence of a 
bizarre ontological category, quite different and 
unrelated to the world studied by science.
However, due to the above-mentioned difficul-
ties in defining naturalism – and consequently 
also anti-naturalism – sometimes the bound-
ary between naturalism and moral antinaturalism 
blurrs. For example, non-reductive naturalism, 
according to which it is impossible to reduce 
moral properties to natural properties, would be 
substantially similar to anti-naturalism. This ver-
sion of naturalism also indicates the important 
limitations of empirical research on morality as-
sociated with the difficulty in finding a natural 
term that would not be moral for each property.
There is no doubt, however, that a paradigmatic 
example of a moral antinaturalist was Moore, 
whose open-question argument was to refute 
all proposals of naturalistic definitions of moral 
concepts. This argument has not survived the 
test of time, but the belief of this British philoso-
pher that it is a mistake to define moral concepts 
in natural categories together with the proposal 
about a special, intuitive way of knowing what is 
good were very widespread in the 20th century. 
Other philosophers who, in the 1930s, laid the 
foundations for the theory of moral intuitionism 
are members of the group referred to as ‘British 
intuitionists’ and its main characters are Harold 
A. Prichard and William D. Ross[29].
Ross’s work, entitled The Right and the Good, 
was the culmination of the evolution of moral 
intuitionism; this theory dominated the British 
philosophy for almost two centuries before its 
publication[30]. In this book, Ross proposed an 
intuitionistic theory, which was characterized by 
such clarity and breadth that this work almost 
immediately became a philosophical classic and 
for a few years after its publication was at the 
center of a furious dispute in moral philosophy. 
Ross’s intuitionism can be divided into two types: 
epistemological and methodological[31]. Accord-
ing to his epistemological intuitionism, it is possi-
ble to have direct knowledge about whether cer-
tain things are right or wrong, which is acquired 
through intuition. This knowledge is possible 
because moral duties, according to which these 
things are right or wrong, are obvious. This leads 
29Prichard, H. (2002) Moral Writings, Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
Ross, W. (2002) The Right and the Good, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
30Ross, W. The Right and the Good, op. cit., p. ix.
31Ibidem, p. xii-xiii.
The most important argument of moral antinaturalists in fa-
vor of distinguishing the natural world from the moral world 
consists in the thesis about the normativity of morality.
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to the conclusion that to know about these du-
ties, it is enough to understand them – they can 
be learned a priori. This does not mean, however, 
that all moral duties can be learnt in this way – 
this only applies to the most fundamental duties. 
Ross calls them prima facie duties. Ross charac-
terizes the obviousness of prima facie duties in 
the following way:
That an act, qua fulfilling a promise, or qua effect-
ing a just distribution of good, or qua returning 
services rendered, or qua promoting the good 
of others, or qua promoting the virtue or insight 
of the agent, is primafacie right, is self-evident; 
not in the sense that it is evident from the begin-
ning of our lives, or as soon as we attend to the 
proposition for the first time, but in the sense that 
when wehave reached sufficient mental maturity 
and have given sufficient attention to the propo-
sition it is evident without any need of proof, or 
of evidence beyond itself, It is self-evident just as 
a mathematicalaxiom, or the validity of a form of 
inference, is evident. (…) In our confidence that 
these propositions are true there is involved the 
same trust in our reason that is involved in our 
confidence in mathematics; and we should have 
no justification for trusting it in the latter sphere 
and distrusting it in the former. In both cases 
we are dealing with propositions that cannot be 
proved, but that just as certainly need no proof[32].
Intuition is, therefore, a rational capacity that al-
lows to comprehend evident judgments. In addi-
tion, intuition is understood cognitively by Ross. 
It also states that it allows not only to recognize 
that a given judgment – moral or mathematical 
– is obvious, but also allows to comprehend the 
truth of these judgments[33].
32Ibidem, p. 29–30. 
33Ibidem, p. 39–41. 
Methodological intuitionism is based on the as-
sumption that there are many moral obligations 
that can be in conflict with each other. In a situ-
ation of conflict between prima facie duties, only 
decisions that are more or less probable regard-
ing the validity or unfairness of the act are possi-
ble. According to Ross, there is no superior moral 
obligation to which other duties can be reduced.
For many philosophers, epistemological in-
tuitionism, which seems to assume the pos-
session of a kind of a moral sixth sense, was 
untenable. This sense was to discover moral 
truth, just like visual perception allows recog-
nizing and distinguishing objects in the direct 
surrounding of a perceiving person. Without 
giving a more detailed explanation of moral 
intuition, its existence seems mysterious and 
some philosophers say that moral intuition is 
only an attempt to add authority to one’s own 
moral opinions[34].
Interestingly, two decades after the publication 
of The Right and the Good, intuitionism was 
widely rejected, primarily due to its assump-
tion about the existence of a moral field that 
would be separate from the natural domain 
and the assumption of intuition as a special 
moral sense[35]. Today, however, one can ob-
serve a renewed interest in intuitionism, and 
Robert Audi – a philosopher who has done 
a lot for the rehabilitation of this theory – at-
tempted to solve the problem of how reason 
can be able to grasp certain basic truths about 
moral reality[36]. Audi claims that the rules re-
34Jonathan Dancy, (1993) Intuitionism, in: A Companion to 
Ethics, ed. Singer, P. Blackwell, p. 412. 
35Ibidem.
36Audi, R. (2004) The Good and the Right: A Theory of Intuition 
and Intrinsic Value, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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garding prima facie duties can be derived from 
the categorical imperative of Kant, which also 
gives the opportunity to systematize them. The 
American philosopher named his theory ‘Kan-
tian intuitionism’ and noted that his solution al-
lows for basing prima facie duties on one com-
mon basis, which consists in treating people 
as goals in themselves. This rule also explains 
the binding force of these duties.
The most important argument of moral anti-
naturalists in favor of distinguishing the natu-
ral world from the moral world consists in the 
thesis about the normativity of morality. This is 
why some modern references to naturalistic fal-
lacy in the moral context concern particularly 
its normative character[37]. Normativity is an is-
sue currently discussed vigorously by philoso-
phers, howeer it is difficult to provide its pre-
cise, non-controversial characteristics. This is 
due, among other things, to the fact that this 
concept is used in relation to various phenom-
ena, such as meaning[38], beliefs[39], law[40], and 
even mathematics[41]. In the moral context, nor-
mativity is usually explained by referring to the 
concept of a reason. A useful analysis of the 
concept of a reason was carried out by Audi, 
which divided it into three categories: norma-
37Brożek, A., Brożek, B., Stelmach, J. Fenomen normatywności, 
op. cit., p. 195–204. 
38Brożek, B. (2013) The Normativity of Meaning, in: The Many 
Faces of Normativity, eds. Stelmach, J., Brożek, B., Hohol, M. 
Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, p. 147–176. 
39Kurek, Ł. Dualizm przekonań. Kraków: Copernicus Center 
Press. 
40Brożek, B. (2012) Normatywność prawa, Warszawa: Wolters 
Kluwer. 
41Brożek, B., Hohol, M. (2013) Czy matematyka jest 
normatywna?, in: W świecie powinności, Brożek, B., Hohol, M., 
Kurek, Ł., Stelmach, J., Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, p. 
173–200. 
tive, motivational, and explanatory[42]. Norma-
tive reasons are objective reasons, regardless 
of whether they are possessed by someone. 
Normative reasons are, therefore, reasons that 
indicate what action is right, for example, avoid-
ing lies. Some normative reasons are reasons 
for every human being, while others are individ-
ualized, like the reason of doing something that 
would help a friend of a given person[43]. These 
reasons can be used to justify action. Motiva-
tional reasons are, on the other hand, reasons 
which someone has – they are always the rea-
sons of a given person for a specific action[44]. 
These reasons can be used to explain the cor-
responding action. Rationalizing explanations 
are, in turn, reasons that indicate why someone 
behaves in a certain way. Explanatory reasons 
mainly indicate the reasons for a given action, 
although they may also motivate. 
Normative reasons which include moral reasons, 
differ significantly from motivational and explan-
atory reasons. For example, moral reasons do 
not have to motivate someone who recognizes 
them to act. People in deep depression are not 
motivated by moral reasons, even if they recog-
nize these reasons. If it is possible to recognize 
a moral reason and not to act in accordance 
with it, then the moral reason will not always be 
the cause of the given action. What is particu-
larly important, anti-naturalists argue that moral 
reasons, as the reasons indicating what action 
should be taken, refer to facts. Only in this way 
can their normative authority be explained. This 
does not mean, however, that the existence of a 
42Audi, R. (2010) Reasons for Action, in: The Routledge 
Companion to Ethics, ed. Skorupski, J., Londyn: Routledge, p. 
275–285. 
43Ibidem, p. 275. 
44Ibidem.
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given moral reason implies that someone has re-
alized its truthfulness. In summary, moral reasons 
have two features that make them seem unfit for 
the naturalistic image of the world: they are ob-
jective – independent of beliefs held by people 
- and they serve to justify and not explain action.
Summary
Naturalistic fallacy was the subject of great dis-
pute in the history of the 20th-century metaeth-
ics, the scale of which was directly proportional 
to the influence of this argument on the develop-
ment of this field of philosophy. In fact, the meta-
ethics of the last century can be understood as 
a sequence of reactions to Moore’s views. Some 
philosophers say, then, that ‘twentieth-century 
British ethics theory is unthinkable without refer-
ence to the Principia Ethica’[45]. One of the most 
45Baldwin T., Moore, G. E. op. cit., p. 66. 
important issues discussed in this work was 
naturalistic fallacy, and modern metaethics de-
veloped precisely on the basis of 20th-century 
British philosophy. The naturalistic fallacy argu-
ment – due to the problems connected with it 
which have been presented above – does not 
currently enjoy a status comparable to its status 
at the beginning of the last century. However, 
many contemporary philosophers admit that the 
naturalization of morals is by no means a simple 
undertaking, and even - as antinaturalists claim - 
that it is entirely impossible. They do not do not 
refer in this context to problems related to the 
definition of moral concepts, but to other issues, 
in particular to the normativity of morality. On the 
other hand, naturists and non-cognitivists want 
to maintain a continuity between philosophy and 
empirical sciences, noting that metaethics is not 
autonomous with respect to these sciences – if 
only because of their important role in determin-
ing the influence of moral judgments on action 
and the nature of moral emotions. 
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